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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROTECTIVE TARIFFS-In the
Flexible Tariff Case ' the Supreme Court of the United States was
called upon to consider for the first time the constitutionality of a
tariff which was avowedly imposed for the purpose of protecting
American industry. What the decision would be upon that point
was a foregone conclusion, for such tariffs had been imposed too
long to be challenged successfully. The only room for uncertainty
was as to the reason which the court would give in support of its
conclusion.
The decision was announced on April ninth in an opinion by
Chief Justice Taft. He pointed out that such taxes had been laid

since 1789 and said,

"So long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its
legislative action are to secure revenue for the benefit of the
general government, the existence of other motives in the selection of the subjects of taxes cannot invalidate Congressional
action. As we said in the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20,
38: 'Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the
legislature on proper subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the incidental motive of
discouraging them by making their continuance onerous. They
do not lose their character as taxes because of the incidental
motive.'"

This position may have met the facts of the case, for the rate on
barium dioxide which was there challenged was not so high as to be
prohibitive. It seems, however, that the court might well have gone

'J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
g, 1928.

See also (1928)

States, U. S. Sup. Ct., decided April

76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 868.
(974)
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further. The President had raised the rate under a statutory provision
which was expressly enacted "in order to regulate the foreign commerce of the United States"; 2 and his proclamation had declared that
he raised it because the commodity was produced more cheaply in
Germany than in the United States. Neither the President nor Congress gave any consideration whatever to the effect of the change
upon the revenues of the United States. The rate was changed solely
in order to regulate foreign commerce, and no other motive for making the change was professed.
In some cases, as in the Child Labor Tax Case,3 the court considers the motive of Congress in enacting legislation. It asks whether
a law which purports to lay a tax was enacted for the purpose of raising revenue. But it should ask this question only when Congress has
power to tax but has no power to regulate. When Congress has both
powers the question is immaterial. In such a case Congress may lay
a tax without reference to the probable revenue to be derived from it
but simply as a method of regulation.
A protective tariff is not an unauthorized regulation masquerading as a tax. It is not a subterfuge but the best means of securing the
precise end sought by Congress. In theory, at least, the duty is
fixed at such a level as to enable Americans to compete with foreign
producers in our home market, but, on the other hand, it gives to the
Americans only a limited monopoly of that market and it automatically
enables foreigners to enter the market successfully if American producers attempt to take undue advantage of their limited monopoly.
Such a tariff regulates foreign commerce by a measure which is in
some respects a tax law, subject, probably, to the requirements that it
operate uniformly throughout the jUnited States and that the law in
which it is imposed originate in the House of Representatives, but it
is authorized by the commerce clause of the Constitution as well as
by the taxing clause.
Congress has complete authority over the importation of commodities into the United States. As the court said in Buttfield v.
4
Stranahan:
"The power to regulate commerce with foreign nations is
expressly conferred upon Congress, and being an enumerated
power is complete in itself, acknowledging no limitations other
than those prescribed in the Constitution. . . . It is not to
be doubted that from the beginning Congress has exercised a
42 STAT. 858, 941 § 315 (1922), U. S. C. (1925) TiT. XIX §§ 1s4-159.
U. S. 20 (1922).
' 192 U. S. 470, 492, 493 (1904).
2259

223

To the same effect are The Abby Dodge,

U. S. i66, 176 (1912) ; Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S.=36, 218 (1915) ;

Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325, 329 (i915); Yee Hem v. United States, 268

U. S. 178 (925);

Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S.320, 334,

342 (i9O9) ; Strathearn S. S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U. S. 348, 356 (i92o) ; Charge

to Grand Jury, 3o Fed. Cas. io26, io3o (C. C. Ga. i859); United States v.
Gould, 25 Fed. Cas. 1375 (S.D. Ala. i86o).

976

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAV REVIEW

plenary power in respect to the exclusion of merchandise brought
from foreign countries: not alone directly by the enactment of
embargo statutes, but indirectly as a necessary result of provisions contained in tariff legislation. It has also, in other than
tariff legislation. exerted a police power over foreign commerce
by provisions which in and of themselves amounted to the assertion of the right to exclude merchandise at discretion ....
"As a result of the complete power of Congress over foreign
commerce, it necessarily follows that no individual has a vested
right to trade with foreign nations which is so broad in character as to limit and restrict the power of Congress to determine
what articles of merchandise may be imported into this country
and the terms upon which a right to import may be exercised."
In classing tariff legislation with regulations of foreign commerce the court was fully supported by the history of tariff legislation by the states immediately before the adoption of the Constitution,
arguments advanced in favor of the adoption of the Constitution, debates in the first session of the First Congress and legislation enacted
as a result of those debates.
For example, on September 2o. I785, Pennsylvania enacted a
tariff law 3 entitled
"An act to encourage and protect the manufactures of this
State by laying additional duties on the importation of certain
manufactures which interfere with them."
And other states adopted similar laws in 1785 and 1786.
STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENXNS.LVAXIA, 99 (1785).
'In Massachusetts the Act of July 2, 1785, c. 17, imposing duties, declared
'12

in a preamble that it was enacted because "it is highly necessary for the welfare
and happiness of all States, and more especially such as are republican, to en-

courage agriculture, the improvements of raw materials and manufactures, a
spirit of industry, frugality and economy, and at the same time to discourage

luxury and extravagance of every kind." In New Hampshire the Act of
March 4, 1786, imposing duties, was enacted because, as stated in the preamble,
"the laying of duties on articles of the produce and manufactures of foreign
countries will not only produce a considerable revenue to the State, but will
tend to encourage the manufacturing of many of those articles in the same."
In Rhode Island an act of the June session, 1785 (18), was entitled "An act
for laying additional duties on certain enumerated articles, and for encouraging
the manufactory thereof within this State, and the United States of America."
And James Madison, writing to Edmund Pendleton in January. 1787, said:
"The (Virginia) Senate have saved our commerce from a dreadful blow which
it would have sustained from a bill passed in the House of Delegates, imposing
enormous duties, without waiting for the concurrence of the other States, or
even of Maryland. There is a rage at present for h;gh duties, partly for the
purpose of revenue, partly for the purpose of forcing manufactures, which it
is difficult to resist."

I MADISON, WORKS, 271.
See also HILL, THE FIRST
STAGES OF THE TARIFF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, 44, 108 (Publications of
American Economic Assn., vol.. 8) ; I STANWOOD, ATMERICAN TARIFF CONTROVERSIES, 25.
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The Federal Convention did not consider it necessary to discuss
the question whether Congress might impose tariffs primarily for the
purpose of regulating foreign commerce. Madison merely approached
such a discussion when he said concerning state tariffs :7
"The encouragement of manufactures in that mode requires duties not only on imports directly from foreign countries, but from other States in the Union, which would revive all the mischiefs experienced from the want of a general
government over commerce."
The members of the Convention cannot have been ignorant of
the state laws establishing protective tariffs. It was probably a
thought that Congress might enact such laws for the benefit of the
north and to the detriment of the south which led some members of
the Convention' to urge that laws for the regulation of commerce
should be passed only by two-thirds vote of each House of Congress.
Some of the southern members waived this point in consideration of
the northern concession that the slave trade should not be prohibited
before i8o8,9 although Mason, who was opposed to the slave2
trade, 10 protested until the end of the Convention,"' and Virginia '1
proposed an amendment to the Constitution providing that "no navigation law, or law regulating commerce, shall be passed without the
consent of two-thirds of the members present, in both Houses."
After the Convention had decided that a majority vote in each House
should be sufficient for the enactment of laws regulating foreign
commerce, no one proposed to limit the power of Congress to regulate
foreign commerce by protective tariffs.
The Federalist said nothing upon the subject of such tariffs.
The proceedings in the state conventions were not fully reported.
For example, in Pennsylvania the advocates of the Constitution prevented the making of a complete report of the debates.'" But we
know that in the Massachugetts convention Thomas Dawes of Boston
made an argument in favor of the adoption of the Constitution in
which he said:"
"Our agriculture has not been encouraged by the imposition of national duties on rival produce; nor can it be, so long as
the several States may make contradictory laws. .
8
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"Our manufactures are another great subject, which has received no encouragement by national duties on foreign manufactures, and they never can by any authority in the Confederation. . . . The very face of our country leads to manufactures. Our numerous falls of water, and places for mills,
where paper, snuff, gunpowder, iron works, and numerous other
articles, are prepared-these will save us immense sums of
money, that otherwise would go to Europe. The question is,
have'these been encouraged? Has Congress been able, by national laws, to prevent the importation of such foreign commodities as are made from such raw materials as we ourselves
raise?
. .
If we wish to encourage our own manufactures-to preserve our own commerce-to raise the value of our
own lands-we must give Congress the powers in question."
In the first session of the First Congress, the second law placed
upon the statute books 15declared that it imposed duties there named
not only in order to raise revenue but also for the encouragement and
protection of manufactures. The debates in Congress showed that as
to many items the protection of American industries was the only
point considered in fixing the tariff.'"
For example, Sherman of
Connecticut moved that a tariff of six cents per pound be laid on
manufactured tobacco, "as he thought the duty ought to amount to a
prohibition." That rate was established.1 7 And many other instances
could be given in which Congress considered only the regulatory
aspects of proposed taxes. In several cases there were vigorous disagreements as to the duties which should be charged; Is but no member of either the House or the Senate suggested the least doubt as to
the power of Congress to lay duties primarily for the purpose of protection. Every one accepted the argument made by Madison early in
the debate: 19

" Act of July 4, 1789, c. 2, §
isI

ANNALS OF CONGRESS,

I, I STAT. 24.

io6 (Fitzsimons), lO7 (White), l09, io (Hart-

ley), xii, 113, 114 (Madison), i19 (Boudinot), i44 (Fitzsimons, Lawrence),
145 (Sinnickson, Madison), 146 (Fitzsimons), 147 (Clymer, Fitzsimons), 153
(Goodhue), i54, 155 (Scott), 157 (Ames), 167 (Sherman, Carroll, Clymer),
170 (Bland, Parker), 208 (Fitzsimons, Gerry); MACLAY'S JOURNAL, 54, 55,
56, 6I, 62, 73, (Maclay).
1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 167.
See, e. g., MACLAY'S JOURNAL, 71-73.
I ANNALS OF CONGRESS, III. Twenty-six years later, as President of the
United States, Madison again urged the adoption of protective tariffs (I RIcHARDSON,

MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS,

567) ; and in September, 1828, he wrote

to Joseph C. Cabell a long argument maintaining the constitutionality of such
tariffs. (3 MADISON, WORKS, 636-647). See also ANNALS OF CONGRESS, i8th
Cong., 1st sess., 1994, 2121; Jefferson, Report on foreign commerce on December 16, 1793, JEFFERSON, WORKS; STORY, CONSTITUTION, §§ 1082 et seq.;
COOLEY, TAXATION, §§ 26,

(1882).

27; Russell v. Williams, Io6 U. S. 623, 624, 625
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"The States that are most advanced in population, and ripe
for manufactures, ought to have their particular interests attended
to in some degree. While these States retained the power of
making regulations of trade, they had the power to protect and
cherish such institutions; by adopting the present Constitution,
they have thrown the exercise of this power into other hands;
they must have done this with an expectation that those interests would not be neglected here."
It is true that the act was so phrased that it did not show on its
face that any particular items were designed for any other purpose
than raising revenue. Therefore little can be made of the point that
its validity was not challenged in court. But a great deal can be made
of the debates in Congress. As shown by those debates, taxes for the
primary purpose of protecting American producers were imposed
by a Congress many of whose members had taken an active part in the
framing of the Constitution and all of whom were familiar with the
discussions which attended its adoption; the law was approved by the
President who had presided over the Constitutional Convention; and
no one in that generation, in court or elsewhere, questioned the constitutionality of imposing tariffs for the primary or even exclusive
20
purpose of protecting American industries from foreign competition.
Such a contemporaneous interpretation of the Constitution is of the
highest importance.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Buttfield
v. Stranahlan,21 has classed protective tariffs with exercises of the
power of Congress over foreign commerce.
Therefore, while the passage quoted from the opinion in the
Flexible Tariff Case,22 in which a tariff rate was sustained upon the
ground that the protection was a merely incidental accompaniment to
the raising of revenue, may have been sufficient to dispose of the case
then before the court, it seems clear that an act of Congress establishing a tariff for the avowed primary purpose of regulating foreign
commerce would not violate either the letter or the spirit of the Constitution.
Robert P. Reeder.
Washington, D. C.
THE RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION AS EXTENDED TO NEGLIGENT

TORTFEASRS-It is a fundamental doctrine in equity that where

several parties are bound equally by a common obligation, each shall
ultimately discharge a proportionate share. And where one has been
compelled to respond for a greater amount, he may be reimbursed

to I STANWOOD, AMERIcAN
21192

TARIFF CONTROVERSIES,:293.

U. S. 470 (1904), quoted on page 975, supra.

Page 974, supra.
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1
While similar relief
for the excess in a suit against the others.
such right is founded
that
may now be obtained at law, it is said
only on broad principles of natural justice and does not arise from
contract, although action is ordinarily allowed in the nature of an
implied assumpsit.
The broad statement has usually been made, however, that as between joint tortfeasors, the right to contribution does not exist.
This principle, in so far as it applies, is based on the unwillingness
of the courts to grant relief at the instance of one who stands in need
of it only because of his own wrongdoing. In equity, the clean hands
maxim is familiar; in law: "Ex turpi causa non oritur actio./ 2
The rule denying contribution in such cases was first announced in
Merryweather v. Nixan,3 where the joint tort consisted in an intentional injury to a reversionary interest in a mill by two persons.
There being a recovery against one, he sued upon an implied assumpsit for contribution of one-half. Lord Kenyon, in denying relief,
said that there could be no such action where the former recovery
was for a tort.4 However, the courts very quickly narrowed this
broad statement, finding a host of exceptions.
In the first place, the rule was probably intended to be confined
to suits by active wrongdoers. Where a recovery in tort is had
against one whose liability is merely secondary or imputed, as under
the doctrine respondeat superior,he may have relief in the nature of
indemnity as against the person primarily liable,5 or contribution as
against those bound jointly with him. A common instance of the
latter is a case where a member of a partnership has been made to
answer for the tort of the partnership servant." The rule was
further restricted to exclude mere technical wrongdoers, persons who,
through mistake or ignorance, had done an act not inherently wrongful, but to which the law has attached a tort liability. Early examples

'5 Pom Roy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. gig) §§ 2334, 2338. The
doctrine involves the equitable maxim "Equality is Equity."
2I COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. i9o6) 26o et seq.
'8 T. R. i86 (Eng. 1799). The rule is said to have been foreshadowed,
however, in Battersey's Case, Winch 48 (Eng. 1623).
' For a discussion of the rule as universally applied, see T. W. Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence (1898) 12 HART.
L. REV. 176.
'Where a master has been forced to pay for the tort of his servant: Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. v. Jossey, io5 Ga. 271, 3 r S. E. 179 (i898);
where a city is held liable for a nuisance maintained in the sidewalk by the
occupant of a house: Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, i6i
U. S. 3r6 (1896); Brookville v. Arthurs, 13o Pa. 5or, i8 Adt. io76 (i8go).
Cf. Churchhill v. Holt, 127 Mass. 165 (1879).
The right to indemnity is to be distinguished from the right to contribution in that it allows full reimbursement. Also, apart from the equitable remedy, the action for the former may be in the nature of trespass, Brookville
v. Arthurs, supra, while only implied assumpsit lies for contribution. See 5
POMEROY, op. cit. szpra note 1, § 2335.
'Horbach's Admr. v. Elder, 18 Pa. 33 (1851); STORY, PARTNERSHIP (7th

ed. I881) §22o et seq.
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were the attachment of the wrong person's goods by the joint creditors
of another, 7 or the commission of an act prohibited by statute without knowledge of its illegality.8 These cases generally laid it down
as a conclusive test that contribution will be denied only when the
persons knew or must be presumed to have known that they were
doing an unlawful act.
The only difficulty arises in applying this test to cases of torts
based on mere unintentional negligence. Where it is the violation
of a common duty attaching to a joint enterprise that constitutes the
tort, contribution has been allowed by analogy to the preceding cases.9
But where separate duties are violated by persons on separate enterprises, the analogy ceases, for they are not strictly joint tortfeasors,
although the injury caused is one and indivisible, and, as between
themselves, their culpability is equal, so that joint action against them
is permitted. 0 On the other hand, their equities ought to be at least
as great as if they had been on a joint enterprise, for a recovery
against one makes him liable for the negligence of the other, notwithstanding that were it not for such negligence the injury would
not have occurred. It is clearly inequitable to allow the complete
burden to be placed entirely according to the caprice of the injured
person, who may enforce payment from either one as he wishes;
besides, the opportunity for collusion is boundless. The ultimate
question, therefore, would seem to be whether a negligent act is so
inherently wrongful as to deprive the actor of his right to be heard
in a court of justice."'
In the recent Pennsylvania case of Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher
Co., 1" an injury had been caused in a collision resulting from the concurring negligence of the operators of a trolley car and a delivery
"Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203 (853) ; see Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bingham 66 (Eng. 1827). Semble, Thweatt's Admr, v. Jones, i Randolph 328 (Va.
1823).

'Torpy v. Johnson, 43 Neb. 882, 62 N. W. 253 (I895).
"Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co., 66 Pa. 218 (187o) (where an injury was
caused due to the disrepair of a bridge maintained jointly by the two counties).
This decision was likened to a case of partnership in Morton v. Union Traction Co., 2o Pa. Super. 325, 334 (i9o2) ; Ankenny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. Iog,
33 N. W. 320 (1887). Cf. Spalding v. Oakes, 42 Vt. 343 (i869).
10 It
is often said that without concert of action there is not a joint tort,
and hence a joint action cannot be maintained. Weist v. Traction Co., 2o Pa.
152 (igoI),
But this rule is not generally extended to cases of concurrent
negligence. See note (i9o6) 54 U. oF" PA. L. REv. 45, 55.
'To be distinguished are those situations where the tortfeasors are not
in pari delicto as between themselves, in which case the party whose fault is
only secondary may have full indemnity.

The distinction regards the quality

rather than the degree of the negligence, as where a manufacturer delivers a
defective machine to one who negligently fails to examine it. Boston Woven

Hose Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N. E, 657 (igoi); Pullman Co. v.
Cincinnati, N, 0. & T. P. Ry., 147 Ky. 498, 144 S. W. 385 (i912); Phila. Co. v.
Traction Co., i65 Pa. 456, 3o Atl. 934 (,895). Cf. cases supra note 5. Cf. also
Horrabin v. City of Des Moines, I98 Iowa 549, I99 N. W. 988 (Igz4). And see
note in 36 L. R. A. (N. s,) 583 (1912),
12292 Pa, 354 (1928).
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truck. It was indicated by the court that henceforth, in this jurisdiction, there may be contribution between such negligent tortfeasors.
This expression of opinion is prevented from being more than dictum
by the fact that the action was brought by a surety of one tortfeasor
rather than by the tortfeasor himself, and was actually based on the
right of the surety, after having paid a joint judgment against both
of the defendants, to be subrogated to the rights of the injured person
thereon. 13 Nevertheless it is significant of what will probably be the
law, and is contrary to the previously existing impression of the law,
in Pennsylvania. 14 The weight of authority in other jurisdictions
still refuses relief to a negligent wrongdoer who has been made to
bear all of the joint liability, on the ground that he is within the
reasoning of the rule of Merryweather v. Nixan. Says one court:
"What chancellor would listen with favor to the claim of
a plaintiff for contribution or indemnity who admits in his pleading that, but for his failure to perform a public duty, the injury
for which he has been held liable would not have occurred?" 15
The Pennsylvania court, in commenting on the rule of Merrywceather v. Nixan, doubts whether "the doctrine would have arisen
out of a case like the one which occasioned this proceeding, where the
responsibility of the defendants grows out of the rule respondeat
superior." But the cases, in denying contribution, make no distinction on this ground. And yet we have seen that contribution is
"The use plaintiff was surety on the appeal bond of the delivery truck
owner, and having, upon affirmance by the Supreme Court in Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 288 Pa. IO2 (1927), paid the joint judgment against its
principal and the traction company, brought this suit to be subrogated to the
rights of the nominal plaintiff. It was objected by counsel for the traction company that to permit the surety of one defendant to levy for all or part of
the judgment upon the property of the other would be, in effect, to permit contribution between the two. It has been held that such an objection is invalid,
for the surety, under his right to subrogation, stands in the shoes of the judgment creditor, and his rights therefore are not limited by any legal disability
on the part of his principal. Kolb v. National Surety Co., 176 N. Y. 233,
68 N. E. 247 (19o3); City of White Plains v. Ellis, 113 Misc. 5, 184 N. Y.
Supp. 444 (1920), on which see comment in (1921) 5 MINN. L. REV. 37a;
PoAvOY, op. cit. supra note I, § 2351. The court replied, however, that even
if the result of allowing subrogation would be an effectual contribution, nevertheless, inasmuch as the surety had in its brief stated it as its intention to collect one-half of the judgment from each, "we do not look upon it as one that
is improper or unjust," and showed, in a lengthy discussion, that no Pennsylvania
decision had ever held squarely against contribution in such a case.
'See note, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, in (19o6) 54 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 45, for a discussion and criticism of the former law in Pennsylvania. While the court in the Goldman case cites Armstrong Co. v. Clarion
Co., supra note 9, and Horbach's Admr. v. Elder, supra note 6, in support
of allowing contribution, these were cases of partnership or joint undertaking.
"City of Louisville v. Louisville Ry., 156 Ky. 141, 16o S. W. 771 (1913).
In accord, United States Casualty Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 218
Ky. 255, 291 S. W. 709 (1927); Flenner v. Southwest Mo. R. R., 290 S. W. 78
(Mo. 1926); Wise v. Berger, lO3 Conn. 29, 13o Atl. 76 (1925); Union Stock
Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 196 U. S. 217 (19o4).

NOTES

permitted among partners where one has been compelled to pay for
the tort of a servant. It is submitted that the fact that there was no
joint enterprise to begin with, is no reason for denying the aid of the
courts to one who has been guilty of only an imputed wrong.
Regardless of this question, however, it is quite clear that the
opinion in the Goldman case is supported by an increasingly sympathetic attitude of the courts toward one who has committed only a
quasi-delict, an unknowing breach of duty. The English court doubts
that the doctrine of Merr rweather v. Nixan is "founded on any principle of justice or equity or even of public policy", and has refused to
apply it to a negligent tortfeasor. 16 While some recent American decisions continue to apply the doctrine with a growing doubt as to its correctness, 17 others have refused to apply it at all, where the plaintiff's
delinquency is based on mere negligence, 8 recognizing that unless he
has consciously violated the law, it is not unconscionable in him to
ask that his equitable rights be enforced. In many states, this result
has been accelerated by statute.'
This modern view is undoubtedly sound. As a practical matter,
acts of unknowing negligence are of constant and necessary occurrence, as a result of the vast number of absolute duties which a complex society imposes upon its members. To place one who unintentionally breaches one of these duties in the same class with a willful
wrongdoer is clearly unreasonable. The courts have recognized this
fact in connection with other problems. Had they not, then contracts to indemnify for losses occasioned by the promisee's negligence
would be unenforceable, as are promises to relieve one from the con"Palmer v. Wick & Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Co., [1894] A. C. 318,
324.

1 Curtis v. Welker, 296 Fed. ioig (Ct. of Appeals, D. C., 1924), where
the rule was applied with undue harshness to directors of a corporation, whose
joint negligence had permitted the treasurer to embezzle. The court felt itself
bound by Union Stock Yards v. R. R., supra note 15. Norfolk Southern R. R.

v. Beskin, 14o Va. 744, 125 S. E. 678 (1924).

"Public Service Ry. v. Matteucci, 14o Atl. 442 (N. J. 1928); Ellis v.
Chicago & N. W. R. R., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. bo48 (I918), the facts of
which are strikingly similar to the Goldman case. The latter decision was followed in Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195 N. W. 855 (923), and in
underwriters v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 28 N. W. 13 (1926). In the former
case, the court said, "We do not overlook the seeming anomaly

. . . that

defendant Raymond may not recover from defendant Mitchell for the damages

. . . done to Raymond's automobile

. .

, because Raymond's own

and contributing negligence at the time of the collision is an absolute bar
.
., yet he may recover from Mitchell one-half of the injury to his pocketbook, if he pay the plaintiffs their damages caused by the same joint negligence.
Such an anomaly is often the resultant of the application of several rules of
law."

"VA. CODE ANN. (1919) § 5779; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, Supp. 1926) §12a;
Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) §4223; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. 1925, art. 2212 (criticized adversely in a note [1923] I TEX. L. REV. 454). The latter two statutes

allow contribution only after the joint liability has been reduced to a joint
judgment debt.
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sequences of his intentional wrongs, 2' and the door would be closed
to a large part of the legitimate insurance contracts of today. Application of the old doctrine is still justified, however, where it is
clear that the breach of duty was intentional, for in such cases the
reason of the rule denying to a wrongdoer the aid of the court is
applicable.
S.F.
JURISDICTION OF A COURT TO PUNISH CRIMINAL CONTEMPTS

much discussed question in the
law is that of contempt of court, for the reason that it is through this
that the courts are able to preserve their dignity and efficacy. Contempts have been divided into two classes, namely, civil and criminal.
A civil contempt consists in a failure to obey a mandate of the court,
issued in a civil suit, which is detrimental to the opposing party.The courts, in order that the plaintiff may derive the benefit intended
by their decree, attach the person of the defendant to coerce him into
obeying or performing the court's order. Prima facie such an act
is not a contempt against the court's dignity, but is rather an act directed against the person on whose behalf the violated order was
made. A criminal contempt, on the other hand, is an act directed
solely against the authority and dignity of the court and, obviously,
may occur in either a civil or a criminal action. 2 Such a contempt is
variously defined as an act which tends either to obstruct the course
of justice or to prejudice the trial of a case;3 as an act which obstructs the administration of justice and brings the court into disrepute; 4 as acts committed against the majesty of the law, the purpose
of their punishment being the vindication of public authority.' Of
necessity the courts must have the power to attach the person in this
latter class of contempts, in order that the sanctity and function of the
courts may not become a nullity.6
The recent case of State v. Turquette 7 raised two interesting
COMMITTED IN ANOTHER STATE.-A

203 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1751. Contracts to indemnify one for
his own negligence were held valid and not against public policy in Kansas
City, M. & B. R. R. v. Southern Ry. News Co., 15 Mo. 373, 52 S. W. 205
(I899); Peterson v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., i1 Wis. 197, 96 N. W. 532
(903).

'ln re Kahn, 204 Fed. 58I (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Welch v. Barber, 52 Conn.
x47 (1884); Holbrook v. Ford, 153 Ill. 633, 39 N. E. lO71 (1894); Hamburg
v. Benedict, 16o App. Div. 662, 146 N. Y. Supp. 44 (2924).
'Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (igio); In re Kahn,
Holbrook v. Ford, both supra note I; Hurley v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass.

443, 74 N. E. 677 (i9o5).

'State v. Eau Claire, 97 Wis. I, 72 N. W. 193 (1897).
'Gordon v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 461, 233 S. W. 2o6 (gii); Burnett
v. State, 8 Okl. Cr. 639, 129 Pac. 122o (i9&3).
'Er parte Wolters, 64 Tex. Cr. App. 238, 144 S. W. 531 (1912).
'For a further discussion distinguishing the two classes of contempts see
Beale, Contempts of Court (1908) 21 HARV. L. REv. I6I.
7298 S. W. 15 (Ark. 1927).
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questions in connection with criminal contempts. In that case the
judge of an Arkansas court, situated several hundred yards from the
Texas border line, was assaulted by the defendant in the state of
Texas while the court was adjourned for lunch. In holding that the
defendant was guilty of a criminal contempt, the court were obliged
to decide that neither (i) the fact that the assault took place several hundred yards from the courthouse, nor (2) the fact that the
assault took place outside the territorial limits of the state of Arkansas,
deprived the Arkansas court of jurisdiction. These two questions
will be treated in order.
It is well settled that criminal contempts may be either direct
or constructive. The classical distinction is that direct contempts
consist in open insults rendered in the presence of the court, or improper conduct committed so near the presence of the court as directly
to interrupt its proceedings," whereas constructive contempts, on
the contrary, are acts not committed in the presence of the court,
but which nevertheless tend to obstruct and impede the administration
of justice.9 .In the words of Blackstone,' °
"Contempts

.

.

. are either direct, which openly in-

sult or resist the powers of the courts or the persons of the
judges who reside there, or else are consequential, which (without
such gross insolence or direct opposition) plainly tend to create
an universal disregard of authority."
The distinction between direct and indirect contempts is not
merely a theoretical one, because the effect and nature of the two acts
are essentially different. Generally it is only in the case of direct contempts that the offender can be instantly punished, by means of summary proceedings. 1 In the case of indirect contempts, the offender
is either required to show cause why he should not be attached for
contempt, or else the case may be turned over to the grand jury for
consideration. In the former case the courts exercise their additional,
inherent power to immediately protect and preserve their dignity and
authority. It is evident that this power is a prime necessity, because
8
Whitten v. State, 36 Ind. 196 (i8y1) (abduction of the plaintiff); Ferriman v. State, 128 Ill. App. 230 (19o6) (failure of witness to answer subpcena) ; Ex partel McCown, 139 N. C. 95, 5, S. E. 957 (1905) (assault committed on judge at his residence).
'Stuart v. Reynolds, 2o4 Fed. 709 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913) (refusal to turn
over assets to receiver) ; Weldon v. State, 15o Ark. 407, 234 S. W. 466 (1921)
(assaulting the judge eight miles away from the courthouse). It is interesting
to note that in this case the same court which decided State v. Turquette, supra
note 7,did not follow the rule which they lay down in the later case, namely
that a direct contempt is determined by its effect upon the administration of
justice, not by the nearness of the place where the act is committed. See infra
note 13.
1"2

Br

CoMm. *284.

'Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331 (1858); Bender v. Young, 252 S.W.
691 (Mo. 1923) ; Note (1922) 9 VA. L. Rav. 467; Note 8 L. R. A. 586 (189o).
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the courts could not otherwise continue their judicial functions than
by instantly apprehending a person whb directly interfered with the
administration of justice. It is equally clear that in the latter class
of contempts there is no reason why the courts should have the
power to punish the offender immediately, because a slight delay will
not lessen the dignity of justice to any serious extent. Therefore
not only does there appear to be a distinction in the nature of a direct and an indirect contempt, but the procedure of the courts is
materially different, and has logically adapted itself to the two situations.
Undoubtedly the present tendency of the law is to enlarge the
category of direct contempts. Some courts still adhere to the old
rule and determine whether or not a contempt is direct by the propinquity of the court to the place where the contemptuous act occurred--i. e. if the act was not committed in or near the presence
of the court, it is not a direct contempt. 2 The better view, however,
would seem to test the matter by determining whether or not the
act will directly or indirectly obstruct the administration of justice,
regardless of where, in fact, the act constituting contempt was committed.1 3 Accordingly it has been held that assaulting a court examiner in a street adjoining the courthouse,"4 or attacking the judge at
his home during a pending action,1 5 are direct contempts. In McCaully v. United States," where a juror was bribed some distance
away from the courthouse, it was held that the contempt was committed in the presence of the court. Said the court:
"The question is not one of geography or topography, or
propinquity or remoteness, but one of direct influence upon the
administration of justice. The administration of justice is
equally obstructed wherever the act is done; and the place of
solicitation is of absolutely no consequence whatever. Whether
the act was done in the courthouse, or a mile or one hundred miles
away, the result is precisely the same; the disturbance to the
court is precisely the same."
It is thus apparent from this discussion that in the case of State
v. Turquette 17 the court could very properly have held that a direct
' Supra notes 8 and o.
'United States v. Toledo Newspaper Co., 22o Fed. 458 (N. D. i915);
United States v. Huff, 2o6 Fed. 700 (S. D. Ga. 1913) ; United States v. Anonymous, 21 Fed. 761 (D. C. Tenn. 1884). In the last case the court said that
the mere place of ocurrence was not the test of whether a contempt was direct
or not, but rather it depended on the degree with which the act interfered
with justice. The court held that hitting a judge interfered with justice, no
matter where the act occurred.
"Ex parte McLeod, 12o Fed. 130 (D. C. Ala. 19o3).
'Ex parte McCown, supra note 8.
1625 App. D. C. 404 (1905).
"lSupra note 7.
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contempt was committed, regardless of the fact that the assault took
place several hundred yards from the courthouse. There is nothing
which could more directly interfere with justice than an attack upon
the judge less than an hour before the court would convene. But a
further question arises, namely that the assault took place in a foreign
jurisdiction. It is pertinent to inquire whether or not this relieves
the defendant of the charge of contempt.
Ordinarily criminal actions are local. The offense is against
the state where the act is committed, and the defendant can only be
18
tried for the offense in the jurisdiction where the crime occurred.
Therefore if a contempt is only a criminal act, the court's ruling in
State v. Turquette cannot be sustained, However, an act of direct
contempt, at any rate, is not merely criminal in nature, because the
contemnor is attached by summary process, and has no opportunity
for trial by jury.' 9 This contention has been substantiated by cases
where a court, by statute, was denied criminal jurisdiction, and yet
has punished for criminal contempt.20 In the case of State v,Middlebrook 21 the court said:
"The fine and imprisonment which the court is authorized
to inflict are not intended as a punishment for a crime committed
in violation of the criminal law; and a punishment for contempt
is no bar to a prosecution for a breach of the peace, notwithstanding the universal maxim that no one shall be put in jeopardy
twice for the same offense."
It has likewise been held that the disobeyance of a court order respecting property in a foreign jurisdiction is a contempt, because
the act is not criminal, but is merely an offense against the dignity and
authority of the court issuing the order. Considering these authorities, the conclusion that a contempt is something more than a
criminal action is unavoidable, and that being the case, there seems to
be no reason why the power to entertain contempt proceedings should
be influenced by a rule of criminal jurisdiction. It might be argued
that a judicial officer who is outside the jurisdiction of his state
loses his official character, and therefore could not be the subject
of contempt. The answer seems to be that while the act may be a
crime against a private citizen in the state in which it occurred,
it tends in its later effect to interfere materially with the administration of justice by that individual in his official character, and the place
where the assault occurs is of no consequence. Of course the case
" State v. Buchanan, 13o N. C. 660, 41 S. E. io7 (29o2) ; People v. Downs,
136 N. Y. Supp. 440 (1911); CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES (2d ed. 1905) §486.
"2

BISHoP, CRIMINAL LAW (gth ed. 1923) §242, a, I.

'State v. Howell, 8o Conn. 668, 69 Atl. 1057 (i9o8); State v. Middlebrook, 43 Conn. 257 (1876). In the Howell case the court held that no criminal intent was necessary.
21Supra note 2o, at 267.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

988

is even stronger where the offender has committed a direct contempt,
as in State v. Turquette, 22 because in this type of cases as the offender
is reached by summary process, it is clear that his act is not solely
criminal in nature.
An examination of the authorities will disclose the fact that
very few courts have passed on the point as to whether physical acts
committed against persons involved in judicial proceedings are contempts, if such acts occur in a foreign jurisdiction. In the case of
Snow v. Hawkes," the plaintiff was bringing suit in North Carolina.
Hawkes, the father of the defendant in that suit, meeting the plaintiff in Virginia, compelled him by duress to execute a release to the
defendant. In holding that the defendant in the principal case was
guilty of contempt, the North Carolina Court said,
. . . the question of jurisdiction is material only as it
relates to the operation and ultimate effect of the wrongful act.
It is perfectly obvious that respondent's paramount object was
to secure dismissal of the plaintiff's suit by fraud, deceit and imposition of the court. The imposition was to be consummated in
the county where the action was pending through an unlawful
scheme which was intended to be not only continuing, but coextensive with the illegal purpose, and therefore operated in
our own court."
Two other cases have been found which are somewhat analogous
to Snow v. Hawkds. In Hunter v. United States 2" the court held that
the defendant was guilty of a direct contempt, when he removed a boy
from a Maryland institution when the boy was placed by a probation
25
order of the District of Columbia court. And in Ex parte Young,
the court held that it was contempt of court to detain a child outside
the jurisdiction of the state, when the court ordered the defendant to
bring the child before its presence, notwithstanding the fact that the
child had never been within the jurisdiction. But these last two cases
are of little authority on the point here discussed, because in both a
court order was disobeyed, and also in the former case the court argtied that the boy was always in the constructive possession of the
court; and in the latter case the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant was obviously satisfied.
It would seem that the court in State v. Turquette reached a sensible conclusion, and one that should be countenanced by public policy.
If the courts cannot protect the persons of their judicial officers from
acts interfering with the administration of justice, wherever the officers may be, there is indeed a dismal gap in our system of justice.
A. M. H. Jr.
:*Farmers State Bank v. State, 13 OkI. Cr. 283, 164 Pac. 132 (97).
2183 N. C. 365, 111 S. E. 621 (1922).
2448

App. D. C.

29

(1918).

" Ex parte Young, 5o Fed. 526 (E. D. Tenn. 1892).
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EXEMPTION OF GIFTS TO CHARITY UNDER INHERITANCE TAX
STATUTES.-Under early inheritance tax statutes, only gifts to near

relatives of the decedent and to the poor were exempt. Charitable
institutions were not favored.' But today the laws of the federal
government and of almost all our states, exempt from death duties
various kinds of charitable bequests. 2 These exemption provisions,
from the time of their inception, have caused an incessant stream of
litigation. In undertaking any study of these cases, each must, of
course, be considered in the light of the language of the statute under
which it was decided. These statutes vary very widely as to the
breadth of the exemptions accorded. Some statutes, such as the
one in New York,3 are very liberal in granting exemptions. Others
like the statutes in force in Maryland 4 and Pennsylvania, 5 are very
narrow in their scope. However, throughout the cases, regardless
of the nature of the statute in force in the particular jurisdiction,
there is to be noted a remarkable divergence in the attitude of the
courts. Some courts show marked favor to philanthropic bequests,
while others apply a rigid interpretation of the statute, seeking to restrict exemptions. This difference in attitude is the underlying explanation of the divergent decisions laid down by the courts under
practically similar statutory provisions.
Thus, in a number of recent cases, the question has arisen as to
whether the strict identity of the transferee or the nature of the
actual beneficiary is to be considered in determining whether or not
the particular bequest is exempt from taxation under the statute.
The case of Tax Commission of Ohio v. Security Say. Bank & Trust
Co.,' affords a striking illustration of a case in which the court defeated exemption by a strict construction of the statute. The Ohio
statute 7 provides that "the succession of ,any property passing-to

'Dos

PASSOS, INHERITANCE TAX LAW (2d ed. 1895) 92.
' Only five jurisdictions have no statutory provisions, exempting in some
form gifts to charity.-Nebraska, Philippine Islands, Porto Rico, Texas, and
Utah.
"N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 61, § 221, amended by N. Y. LAws,
1925, c. 143.

'MD. CODE (Bagby, 1911) Article 8I, § 12o, as amended by MD. LAWs,
1924, c. 413. Maryland excepts only transfers to the city of Baltimore or to
any county or municipality of the state.
'Act of 1919, P. L. 794, PA. STAT. (West, 1920), §20505. "That all estates in any buildings, ground, books, curios, pictures, statuary, or other works
of art, passing by will from a person seized or possessed thereof to any municipality, corporation, or unincorporated body, for the sole use of the public
by way of free exhibition within the State of Pennsylvania, whether in trust
or otherwise, shall not be subject to any collateral inheritance tax for the use
of the commonwealth." In one case under this statute a gift of land to the
city of Pittsburgh for a public park was held exempt, but a gift of money to
maintain the park was held taxable. In re Frick's Estate, 277 Pa. 242, 121
AUt. 35 (,923).
S159 N. E. 570 (Ohio, 1927).
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or for the use of an institution for purposes only of public charityshall not be taxed." The testator in this case bequeathed property to
a trust company to be held in trust for a period of from fifty to
sixty years. During this time the money and any interest derived
therefrom was to be invested and reinvested until the stipulated period
had expired, and the accumulated sum was then to be used in erecting
a home for aged Masons, their wives, widows, and dependent orphans.
The court, two judges dissenting, he!d that this gift -was not exempt
from taxation. The decision was based on two grounds, first, that
since the money was to be used for a definite period in business, it was
not a gift "for purposes only of public charity", second, that a gift to
members of a single class, such as aged Masons, was not a gift "for
purposes only of public charity." Considering at this point only the
first ground of the decision, it would seem, if the reasoning of the
court is to be followed to its logical conclusion, that any gift of
property in trust, only the income of which is to be used for charitable purposes, would not be a gift "for purposes only of public
charity" within the statute, for the corpus would be invested, and
therefore used in business. No court has as yet gone to such extreme lengths to defeat exemption.
However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in a very recent
case 8 has taken the same stand as the Ohio Court. The Wisconsin
statute 9 provides that property transferred to corporations organized
solely for charitable purposes, to be used in furtherance of such
purpose, is exempt from tax. In this case, the testator bequeathed
money to a trust company, in trust, the income to be used for the
benefit of the needy children in the city of Madison. The court held
that since the money was transferred to a trust company organized
for profit, it was not transferred to a "corporation organized solely
for charitable purposes," and hence was not exempt from taxation. 10
A New York court in one case" applied similar reasoning, and
decided that the question of exemption was t6 be determined by the
identity of the transferee and not by the purpose of the transfer. The
New York statute 12 provides "Any property devised or bequeathed to
any-hospital corporation, wherever incorporated-shall be exempt
from taxation." The testator bequeathed property to the city of
Duluth to be used for a hospital, and the court held that the city
of Duluth was a municipal corporation and not a hospital corporation
and hence, the bequest was not exempt under the statute. But in two
later cases, 13 under the same statute, where bequests were made to
municipal corporations to be used for charitable purposes, it was
'In re Price's Estate,
WIs. STAT. (925)

§§

213

N. W

72.01, 72.04.

477 (Wis. 1927).

also In re Robert's Will, 214 N. W. 341 (Wis. 1927).
'lin re Miller's Estate; iog Misc. Rep. 267, 178 N. Y. Supp. 554 (1919).
Supra note 3.
nli
re Burnham's Estate, 112 Misc. Rep. 56o, 183 N. Y. Supp. 539 (920);
In re Guiteras' Estate, 113 Misc. Rep. 196, 184 N. Y. Supp. i9o (i920).
0 Cf.
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held that the purpose of the gift was the determining factor, and
in administering these purposes, the municipal corporation acted as
a charitable corporation. These cases show a state of mind in the
court diametrically opposed to the attitude of the Ohio and Wisconsin
courts. The legislature as well as the courts of Neiv York has been
adopting a progressively liberal attitude in favoring gifts for charitable purposes.
The majority of courts apply the rule that exemptions from
taxation must be expressed in the statute and are not to be read into
it by implication. 14 But in a Connecticut case, 1" the court held that it
was the settled public policy of the state, not to impair the usefulness
of gifts to organizations carrying on public work, by subjecting them
to taxation, and therefore it required unequivocal language of the
legislature to change that public policy. The statute in Connecticut '6
provided that property bequeathed to Connecticut corporations or
institutions, which received state aid shall be exempt from inheritance
or succession taxes. Property was bequeathed to certain educational
and charitable institutions which did not receive any direct appropriation from the state, but were not subject to ordinary state taxes. The
court held that institutions which are exempt from ordinary taxes
are recipients of "state aid" and therefore exempt from inheritance
tax under the statute. But in a later case,' 7 the court receded somewhat from the very liberal stand they had adopted. In this case
the property had been bequeathed to a corporation, which by its
charter was exempt from taxation on any realty that it might own.
But at the time of the testator's death, the corporation did not own
any realty, and therefore as yet was deriving no benefit from the disposition which the state had shown to aid it. The court held that
the gift to this corporation was taxable, because under the statute, the
donee actually had to be receiving "state aid" at the time of the
testator's death. The theory on which a few courts have held that
these statutes should be construed liberally in favor of charitable organizations, is that such organizations are doing public work and thus
lessening the burden of government. Since taxes are levied, collected
and expended for the purpose of carrying on the work of government, taxing a charitable institution is the same as taxing the state
itself.'
The most important consideration in determining the right to
" Pitney v. Bugbee, 98 N. J. L. 889, 118 At. 780

ecutors v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 64o, io5 S. E.

23o

(1922);

Cornett's Ex-

(192o) ; In re

Duncan's

Estate, 113 Wash. 165, 193 Pac. 694 (192o) ; In re Frick's Estate, supra note 5.
Corbin v. Baldwin, 92 Conn. 99, ioi Atl. 834 (917).
"CONN.

GEN. STAT. (1918)

§ 1261.

',Corbin v. American Industrial Bank & Trust Co., 95 Conn. 50, 1iO Atl.
459

(920).

'itn

re Irwin's Estate, 196 Cal. 366, 237 Pac. 1074 (1925); Heald v.
Johnson, 216 N. W. 772 (Iowa, 1927); Sage's Executors v. Commonwealth,
196 Ky. 257, 244 S. W. 779 (1922). And see dissenting opinion of Frazer, J.,
In re Frick's Estate, supra note 5,
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exemption involves the question as to whether or not the particular
bequest is to an organization or for a purpose of such a nature, that
gifts to it are exempt under the statute. In order to determine
whether the donee, whether a corporation or a society, is a charitable
organization (using "charitable" in its broadest sense), its declared
purposes and the work done by it at the time of the decedent's death
must be looked into. 9 Here again, the determining factor is often
the disposition of the court to adopt a liberal or a narrow attitude.
Thus, the second ground for the decision in Tax Commission of Ohio
v. Security Say. Bank & Trust Co., was that a gift to members of a
single class, was not a gift for purposes solely of public charity. But
in a New York case 20 it was held that a gift of money to be used
in the erection of a temple for a Masonic lodge, was a gift for
charitable and benevolent purposes, even though the beneficiaries of
the philanthropic acts of the society were confined to members of the
society. This New York case represents the more prevalent view,
namely, that a gift may be one solely for public charity, even though
the beneficiaries comprise only a limited class of the public, provided
that no pecuniary return is reserved to the donor or to any particular
person. 2 1 However, if the class that is to benefit by the gift is too
narrow and too limited, courts will not hold that such a gift is a
charitable one. Thus in one case,2 2 where the gift was to a corporation organized to provide the members of a certain family with education, and other needs, the New York Court of Appeals, which is
committed to a liberal attitude, held that the gift was not a gift to
a charitable corporation, because a corporation formed for the purpose of benefiting the needy of one particular family is not a charitable corporation.
In order for a gift to be exempt as a gift for charitable purposes, it must be certain that it will be applied to those purposes. If
the executor or trustee is given discretion as to whether or not it is
to be applied23to purposes, which would make it exempt, the gift is
held taxable.

A very interecting question arises, when the bequest is made to
a charitable society, incorporated in another state. A few states
have statutes specifically providing for this situation. The New
" In re Rockefeller's Estate, 177 App. Div. 786, 165 N. Y. Supp. 154 (1917),
affd 223 N. Y. 563, 11g N. E. 1048 (1918) ; Parkhurst v. Treasurer, 228 Mass.
196, 117 N. E. 39 (1917).
'In re Hiteman's Estate, 1io Misc. Rep. 617, i8o N. Y. Supp. 88o (I92O).
"Heald v. Johnson, Sage's Executors v. Commonwealth, both supra note
i8. Matter of Graves, 242 Ill. 212, 89 N. E. 978 (19o9); Sears v. Attorney
General, 193 Mass. 55r, 79 N. E. 772 (19o7); In re Foss' Estate, i14 Wash.
68r, 196 Pac. 10 (192r).
'In re Beekman's Estate, 232 N. Y. 365, 134 N. E. 183 (1922) reversing
196 App. Div. 68I, 188 N. Y. Supp. 178 (1921).
" Church v. Burbank, 199 Iowa 739, 2oz N. W. 834 (1925) ; Succession of
Ribet, 141 La. 572, 75 So. 414 (1917) ; In re Falk's Estate, 1O2 Misc. Rep. 504,
169 N. Y. Supp. 2o3 (ii8).
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York 24 and Connecticut 25 statutes now exempt gifts to extraterritorial charitable institutions. The Ohio 26 and Iowa2 7 statutes provide
that gifts must be to charitable organizations within the state in
order to be exempt. But when the question arises in a jurisdiction
which does not have it covered by express statutory provisions, there
is a conflict in the decisions. The general view is that the exemption
is to apply solely to charitable corporations within the state, unless
there is an express statute to the contrary.2 8 The theory upon which
this rule is based is that the only reason for statutory exemption is
that the people of the state derive a benefit from the activities of the
institution exempted. If the institution to which he gift is made
is located outside the state, the people of the state are not benefited
by its operation, and there is no reason why it should be exempt
from taxation. Thus it has been held that if the money is to be
used within the state, the fact that the donee is incorporated outside
the state will not prevent exemption. 20 But in a New Jersey case 8 0
where money was bequeathed to a New York corporation, although
the testator specifically directed that it was to be used for the benefit of the poor people of New Brunswick, N. J., the court held that the
gift was not exempt. A similar result was also reached in an
Illinois case. 3' On the other hand, a few courts have decided, in
the absence of an express statutory provision, that a gift to a
charitable corporation even though it is located outside the state,
is not subject to inheritance tax. 2
This last group of cases clearly illustrates the different views
entertained by legislatures as well as courts on the problem of the
exemption of charities from taxation. While the liberal view of
New York seems commendable, a more strict attitude seems to be
firmly established in the vast majority of states in this country.
$. M.
2

Supra note 3.

'PuBLic

AcTs OF 1925, c. 47.

"Supra note 7.
"IOWA CoMP. CODE (1924) § 7308.
' In.re Speed, 216 Ill. 23, 74 N. E. 8W6 (19o5) , Minot v. Winthrop, 162
Mass. 223, 38 N. E. 512 (2894) ;,Alfred University v. Hancock, 69 N. J. Eq.
470, 46 At!. 178 (I9o) ; It re Hicock, 78 Vt. 259, 62 At!. 724 (19o4).
"Carter v. Story, 76 N. H. 34, 78 ktl. 1o72 (I91I). And see Church

v. Burbank, supra note 23.
'Price v. Edwards, 88 N. J. L. 582, 97 Atl. 57 (1916).
"People v. Woman's Home Missionary Society, 303 Ill.
418, 135 N. E.
749 (1922).

" Fiske's Estate, 178 Cal. 116, 172 Pac. 390 (I918); Commonwealth v.
Bingham's Administrator, I96 Ky. 318, 244 S. W. 781 (1922).

